

dCache, towards Federated Identities and Anonymized Delegation

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https://indico.cern.ch/event/505613/contributions/2227700/













Quick recap














Authz



Delegated Authentication
















INDIGO-DataCloud AAI framework











The INDIGO-DataCloud AAI

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The INDIGO Authentication and Authorization Infrastructure (AAI) leverages and extends existing standards (OpenID Connect, OAuth2, SCIM) to enable secure composition of resources from multiple providers in support of scientific applications. The central Identity and Access Management (IAM) service provides tools to implement brokered user authentication, identity harmonization, account linking as well as Virtual Organization (VO) management. Identity information is provided to relying services via OpenID Connect, which allows simpler integration in off-the-shelf software. The Token Translation Service (TTS) integrates services that do not directly support OpenID Connect, by creating credentials on-demand from the identity information provided by the IAM. This poster introduces the main INDIGO AAI components and highlights the main architectural decisions that were taken during the first year of the INDIGO project.

1. Identity = OpenID Connect

The INDIGO [1] AAI Identity layer leverages the OpenID Connect [2] standard to provide user authentication and identity information to INDIGO services. This approach provides several advantages:



- Standardized and widely adopted solution Accommodation of several authentication mechanisms (via identity
- Simplified integration in relying services
- Native support for delegation and offine access
- · Native support for dynamic client registration

2. Identity harmonization and brokering

The INDIGO Identity and Access Manag (IAM) [3] service deals with user authentication and identity brokering, allowing users to authenticate with local username and password, SAML, X.509 certificates, or via a remote OpenID Connect provider (e.g., Google). The different identities are linked to a single INDIGO user prof le, which provides each user with a unique, persistent identif er. This identif er is then used for auditing, accounting and authorization at all relying services. Other attributes, like group membership information, can be linked to the user profile, and then exposed to relying services via standard OpenID Connect interfaces.



4. Identity provisioning

INDIGO IAM leverages the standard System for Cross Domain Identity Management (SCIM) [8] version 2.0 to SCIM implement identity provisioning, de-provisioning and

The SCIM APIs provides means to propagate identity and group information to relying services, to implement, for instance, dynamic account creation and other resource lifecycle management at various levels of the INDIGO infrastructure depending on events related to user identity status.

5. Delegation and offine access

OAuth and OpenID Connect support delegation and offline access natively To support chained delegation across services, in which a component can act both as a service and as a client for another downstream service, the INDIGO IAM provides a partial implementation of the OAuth token exchange draft standard [6]. The token exchange is used in particular to implement controlled delegation of

offline access rights across

tasks on behalf of a user while the user is not connected).

3. Authorization = OAuth 2 + XACML

INDIGO services expose functionality through HTTP APIs protected by OAuth 2 [4]: only agents presenting a valid and trusted **OAuth access token** are granted access to INDIGO services. This token is obtained by client applications from the INDIGO IAM service and provides access to identity information (e.g., group membership and other attributes) and other authorization

information (e.g. OAuth scopes). Fine-grained. powerful and distributed attribute-based authorization is implemented by integrating the

authorization service [5] with the layer This provides

policy distribution and centralized XACML policy management.

6. Token translation and non-HTTP services

INDIGO AAI integrates services that rely on different authentication mechanisms (e.g., X.509 certif cates, SSH keys, Amazon S3 keys) via the INDIGO Token Translation Service (TTS) [7].

The TTS translates an OpenID Connect authentication assertion, like the one issued by the IAM service, into one of the supported downstream service credentials. The

- TTS currently supports the generation of: SSH keys
- X.509 certif cates
- OpenNebula usemame/password credentials



7. References



OpenID-Connect under the hood

```
paul@sparkplug:~$ curl -D- -s -o/dev/null -L
https://prometheus.desy.de/Users/paul/private-file | head -1
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
paul@sparkplug:~$
```


Log into IAM.
Get access token

```
paul@sparkplug:~$ curl -L -H "Authorization: Bearer ey...QT7s"
https://prometheus.desy.de/Users/paul/private-file
This is a demo file containing some limited information to
demonstrate permission handling.
```

This is a private file, only user paul can read it. paul@sparkplug:~\$



OpenID Connect delegation





Authorisation without authentication?






Authz token use-cases

Community Portals

User DB dCache Portal

Sharing





Constraints and solutions

- Redirection should work without JavaScript,
- Simple: embed token in redirection URL.

http://webdav.example.org/path/to/file?authz=<TOKEN>

- Complete token always sent with the request.
- What can we do to stop someone stealing this token?
 - ... or make the token useless if they steal it.



Introducing Macaroons





Macaroons 101

- Macaroon is a bearer token.
- Macaroon contains zero or more caveats.
- Each caveat limits something about the macaroon:


```
who can use it,where they can use it, orwhat they do with it.
```

Anyone can add a caveat to a macaroon:

Create a new macaroon that is more limited.

The caveats in a macaroon cannot be removed.








3rd party caveats – extra cool!

- A 1st party caveat can be satisfied by the client.
- A 3rd party caveat requires proof from some other service; e.g.
 - only fred@facebook,
 - only members of VO ATLAS,
 - only if not part of a denial-of-service attack.
- The proof is another macaroon: a discharge macaroon.







Coming to dCache for v3.1

- Supporting caveats with IP address, paths, activity*, expiry time.
 - list, download, upload, manage, delete, readmetadata, update-metadata.
- Simple RESTful API to acquire a macaroon.
- Initially targeting HTTP/WebDAV.



Backup slides



What are bearer tokens?

Bearer token is something the user presents with a request so the server will authorise it. There's no interaction between client and server.

Examples of bearer tokens:

HTTP BASIC authn, anything stored as a cookies.

Counter-examples:

- X.509 credential,
- SAML,
- Kerberos.





Group membership, too

- An OIDC provider can assert the user is a member of various groups
- Group membership may require higher level of LoA:

For example, if the group is "loose collaboration" a site might require higher LoA; if the group is "commercial entity" a site might require lower LoA



One solution: a bearer token

